Two common misconceptions
August 21st, 2007
There are two particular criticisms which have been raised several times, in various forms. Rather than continue to correct them at each turn, I'll just address them here.
Example one (from C|NET's coverage):
Assumption is flawed, with multiple voting machines and time taken to vote differences, matching sign in records to time stamped records doesn't provide proof of that individual's vote.
In fact, there are both beginning and ending timestamps for each vote entry, with down-to-the-second precision. Although this doesn't guarantee the accuracy of every decoded vote,
- it provides a high degree of accuracy, in the aggregate, and
- the degree of accuracy of any individual vote can be reasonably calculated (in other words, you'll know how right or wrong you are with each vote).
Example two (from ColumbusING):
Wouldn’t work. The way the voting process works essentially randomizes voters. Knowing the order in which people voted does not tell you what machine they used. Without that link (order w/ machine), the information is useless.
At any given time, each voting machine will have one Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail. For the machines discussed here, that is a roll of paper which contains the beginning and ending timestamps for each voting session.
August 22nd, 2007 at 09:54 AM The secret ballot issues raised by Moyer and Cropcho won't be solved until the toilet-paper roles used to sequentially record voter activity are eliminated. As a Colorado poll watcher, I have the right to record the names of people who vote. By observing the sequence in which they use a specific DRE, I know the sequence of their (supposed) votes recorded on the VVPAT. Access to the roll means access to their "ballot". The canvass board and election officials have legal access to the roll. NO!, I do not trust the officials. Not because they are evil, but because the protection of a secret ballot is sacrosanct. If any pathway to retrieving a specific voters ballot exists, it might be used: (1) by the court, or (2) for political purposes by a partisan official, or (3) to create a "threat of disclosure" needed by vote-buyers and voter-intimidators to suggest that they can know a voter's selections. Furthermore, HART Intercivic suffers not only the problem described above, but also uniquely identifies every PAPER and VVPAT ballot with a unique, NON-REMOVABLE, serial number and barcode. Voters can make a record of this serial number on their ballot and use it to later identify their specific ballot. Consequently, the market for vote-selling is facilitated and the opportunity for voter intimidation is supported. The arrogance of vendors who trample on our right to use a secret ballot must be punished by immediately forcing them to meet our requirements for "privately voted anonymous ballots". Al Al Kolwicz Colorado Voter Group 2867 Tincup Circle Boulder, CO 80305 303-494-1540 AlKolwicz@qwest.net www.AlKolwicz.net www.coloradovotergroup.blogspot.com
August 22nd, 2007 at 04:01 PM Thank you for sharing your findings. I wrote about similar attack late last year: No Privacy on King County's Touchscreens In brief, if your poll site doesn't somehow shuffle (mix) the order of the voters using a touchscreen, you can infer how everyone voted. Without using timestamps. King County WA currently has a single touchscreen per poll site. So the order of the voters doesn't get shuffled. Ballot boxes are the physical equivalent of a secure one-way hash. After the ballot goes into the box, there's no way to tie it back to the voter. You achieve end-to-end traceability and the public vote count by ensuring the physical security of the ballots. At this time, there is no computerized voting system that ensures both the secret ballot and the public vote count. Some academics think it can be done with novel voting systems (e.g. PunchScan). I remain unconvinced. Cheers, Jason Osgood / Seattle WA
August 22nd, 2007 at 04:31 PM
Man, these comments are formatted terribly :(
That's my bad.
Sorry, readers.